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Abstract 
Few issues are more important yet less understood than outside interventions in intra-state 
conflicts. Under what circumstances do intervening states further their interests and when, 
contrarily, do they plunge into quagmires? France is a critical case.  It is, statistically, the 
world’s second intervenor and earned the sobriquet of Africa’s gendarme through frequent 
interventions in African wars. The ability of such a medium-sized state to intervene with greater 
regularity and ostensible success than larger powers raises questions about how France manages 
its interventions. Do French interventions draw on the French Army’s distinctive “school” of 
population-centric counterinsurgency, which emphasizes the need to militarize governance in 
pursuit of comprehensive victories? Or do the French Fifth Republic’s civil-military institutions 
encourage policymakers to carefully regulate force’s employment in pursuit of limited ends?  
This study draws on declassified archives to test which approach most characterizes French 
interventions. To preview my conclusions, strategic satisficing—the use of minimal force for 
short durations to produce satisfactory outcomes—distinguishes the Fifth Republic’s 
interventions from other powers’ practices and prior French counterinsurgencies.  This 
particular form of interventionism enables France to influence a large number of intra-state 
conflicts and maintain a network of security agreements with African states.  
 
 
Introduction 
Great power interventions in intra-state conflicts are a defining characteristic of 
contemporary international relations.  Civil wars and insurgencies are far more common than 
classic inter-state wars, meaning that contemporary armed forces frequently face non-state 
adversaries.  France is a critical case within this context.  French officers developed a distinctive 
“school” of population-centric counterinsurgency between the 1840s and 1960s that enriched 
subsequent Anglo-American debates on the subject.  France today continues to play a 
disproportionate role in intra-state wars and intervenes in more African civil wars than any other 
power.  The question remains, however, as to whether France’s success as Africa’s self-
proclaimed gendarme is rooted in counterinsurgency practices that reached maturity during the 
Algerian War or other dynamics generated by the Fifth Republic’s civil-military institutions. 
France’s Army gradually developed a counterinsurgency “school” from the 1840s 
onward with characteristics distinct from other population-centric approaches.  These practices 
evolved over the course of multiple conflicts and many distinct doctrines.  They all, 
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nevertheless, emphasize the need to militarize civil governance in pursuit of comprehensive 
victories won through protracted campaigns.  They also share a common focus on separating 
insurgents from potentially supportive populations via population control and psychological 
warfare measures.  French counterinsurgency theory, finally, attributes a decisive tactical role 
to indigenous paramilitary forces and elite French units working in tandem.         
While France’s military still cherishes these practices, another factor shaping France’s 
interventions in Africa are the French Fifth Republic’s institutions.  Recurrent civil-military 
crises drove the Fifth Republic’s founders in 1958 to develop institutions to better control 
military operations.  To this end, they appointed civilian proconsuls to oversee military 
campaigns, civilianized counterinsurgencies’ non-military components, and exploited rivalries 
between parallel military staffs.  Because these new institutions empower civilian policymakers 
to pursue their preferences, there are powerful reasons for anticipating that they have likewise 
transformed French interventions.  This would likely express itself in strategic satisficing, 
which is the use of minimal amounts of military force, tightly coupled with diplomacy, to 
achieve satisfactory political outcomes.       
This study assesses whether the military’s deeply-ingrained counterinsurgency culture 
or the Fifth Republic’s civil-military institutions shape French interventions.  To preview my 
conclusions, institutions rather than organizational culture predominate.  Contemporary French 
operations are thus driven by political leaders’ quest to achieve satisfactory outcomes at 
minimal cost, rather than by highly autonomous military commanders seeking comprehensive 
victories through traditional counterinsurgency practices.  This transformation in how France 
conducts counterinsurgencies, likewise, shapes France’s international behavior.  Leaders’ 
ability to carefully regulate how much military power they commit enables them to avoid open-
ended commitments and achieve reasonable outcomes at affordable prices.   
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This, in turn, renders it less risky for France to intervene militarily in Africa than it 
would be for other industrialized democracies.  Strategic satisficing—facilitated by institutions 
that maximize civilian control over the military—thus empowers France to play an outsized 
role as Africa’s gendarme.    
 
France’s Counterinsurgency Culture 
France’s armed forces, along with their British counterparts, are credited with 
developing the “population-centric” approach to counterinsurgency.  Central to population 
centric counterinsurgency is the notion that controlling a potentially hostile population and 
preventing insurgents from interacting with that population is counterinsurgents’ essential 
mission.  France’s armed forces gradually developed a distinctive repertoire of 
counterinsurgency practices beginning in the mid-1830s, when military leaders recognized the 
limited value of unrestricted violence for pacifying Algeria.  Army efforts to apply notions of 
“peaceful penetration” to conquer the Algerian Sahara however foundered practically and 
intellectually, leading frustrated field commanders to revert to more punitive methods.1   
Much of France’s subsequent imperial expansion consequently differed little in its 
brutality from that of other European states.2  A cadre of French officers nevertheless persisted 
that they could pacify territories with less naked force and more recourse to artifices to separate 
guerrillas from sympathetic populations.  France’s successive conquests in Indochina, 
Madagascar and Morocco then enabled Marshals Joseph-Simon Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey 
                                                          
1 Benjamin Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the 
Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902 (New York: Columbia UP, 2009), 27-89. 
2 Jacques Frémeaux, De quoi fut fait l’empire (Paris: CNRS, 2010), 453-81. 
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to develop and apply a veritable counterinsurgency doctrine or method.3  Later challenges, 
ranging from combatting the Riff uprising and Great Druze Revolt in the 1920s, to fighting 
Cold War-era national liberation movements, provided ample scope for successive generations 
of French officers to further theorize about how to fight insurgencies.  
The Cold War-era counter-revolutionary warfare partisans Roger Trinquier and Charles 
Lacheroy thus drew on this intellectual legacy extending back to earlier theorists of imperial 
pacification.4  A uniquely French “school” of counterinsurgency thus gradually extended roots 
within the French Army.  This French variant of population-centric counterinsurgency differs 
from its British counterpart in its greater emphasis on: militarized civil governance; population 
controls and psychological warfare; indigenous paramilitary forces; and aggressive elite units.5     
Key to the French approach was a belief that only field commanders can determine the 
political and military measures that are necessary to defeat an insurgency.  French commanders 
recognized the primacy of political factors over military ones since the late 19th century, when 
Gallieni argued that “the best means of pacifying [colonies]… is through the combined impact 
of [military] force and political action.”6  Another officer, Lieutenant-Colonel David Galula, 
                                                          
3 Michael Finch, A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and 
Colonial Pacification in Tonkin and Madagascar (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 31-211. 
4 Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 33/5 (2010), 727-58. 
5 British theorists framed Britain’s counterinsurgency practices as characterized by: 1) 
use of minimum force; 2) the military’s employment in support of civil authorities; and 3) 
efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of populations.  In practice, British commanders 
frequently transgressed these prescriptions and varied in how they conducted their campaigns.  
Nevertheless, the British Army generally conducted counterinsurgencies in a less coercive and 
more political fashion than the French.  Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths 
of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013), 246-88; and Paul Dixon, “’Hearts 
and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 
32/3 (2009), 353-381.    
6 Joseph-Simon Gallieni, "Principes de Pacification et d’Organisation," Bulletin 
Officiel de Madagascar et de ses Dépendences No. 26 (1898), 165. 
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building on Gallieni’s hypothesis calculated during the Algerian War that "A revolutionary war 
is 20 per cent military and 80 per cent political."7  However, rather than holding military force 
tributary to civil reforms, French theorists stressed the need for military authorities to assume 
the functions normally performed by civilian agencies.8 
The rationale for military supremacy was that only the armed forces possess the 
centralized authority and coercive force needed for a comprehensive counterinsurgency effort.  
As Gallieni argued, “Only the military’s organization of territories, with its accompanying close 
surveillance [of populations], is capable of penetrating [society] deeply enough to extirpate all 
surviving germs of rebellion.”9  Playing such a large role in civil administration invariably drew 
officers to assume duties beyond those narrowly associated with military operations.  Writing 
in 1900, Lyautey argued that “An army company is not only a military unit but, above all, a 
reservoir of: foremen, artisans, teachers, gardeners and agronomists.”10  Over half a century 
later, the French army assumed an even greater range of civilian missions, including education, 
police duties and health care.   
Besides championing the need for military supremacy, French officers prioritized 
population control and psychological action.  French doctrine held that populations, particularly 
colonial ones, are fundamentally apolitical and can be compelled through repressive institutions 
and material incentives to accept any regime’s authority.  Reflecting this mechanistic view of 
populations, Galula argued that "In any case, whatever the cause, there will be an active 
minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.  The 
                                                          
7 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport: Praeger, 
2006, orig. 1964), 63. 
8 Roger Trinquier, La guerre moderne (Paris: Economica, 2008, orig. 1961), 40-43. 
9 Gallieni, "Principes de Pacification et d’Organisation," 170. 
10 Hubert Lyautey, "Du Role Colonial de l’Armée," Revue des Deux Mondes 69/4 
(1900), 318. 
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technique of power consists of relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral 
majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority."11  General André Beaufre 
expanded on this observation, arguing that counterinsurgencies are won by psychologically 
“provoking a veritable civil war between populations that have rallied, supported by the 
[French] military, and those that are still dissident.”12  French practitioners recognized, 
however, that rallying populations is an incremental process whereby counterinsurgents 
patiently expand pacified zones.  Gallieni warned his subordinates against excessive haste by 
referring to this form of participation as action lente or “slow action.”13   
French officers gradually developed institutions of mass surveillance and propaganda to 
expedite this process.  The Army’s colonial intelligence services and bureaux arabes, indeed, 
achieved such a degree of sophistication that French colonies arguably already constituted 
“intelligence states” prior to the Second World War.14  The failed Indochina War of 1945-54, 
however, exposed officers to Marxist and Maoist techniques of indoctrination and population 
control.15  France’s new generation of theorists incorporated these totalitarian practices into 
their existing repertoire, developing a “technical-organizational approach…. close to systems 
analysis” for dominating populations.16  Propaganda campaigns rooted in crowd psychology 
and measures to encourage inhabitants to inform on one-another were foundational to this 
                                                          
11 Galula, 53. 
12 André Beaufre, La guerre révolutionnaire: Les formes nouvelles de la guerre (Paris: 
Fayard, 1972), 78. 
13 Joseph-Simon Gallieni, Trois Colonnes au Tonkin (Paris: R. Chapelot, 1899), 156. 
14 Martin Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence States,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 28/6 (2005), 1033-60. 
15 Paul Villatoux et Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La République et son armée face au 
« péril subversif »  (Paris: Les Indes Savants, 2005), 207-368. 
16 Beatrice Heuser, "The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency," Journal of 
Strategic Studies 1/30 (February 2007), 155. 
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revised approach.  These techniques were institutionalized in the Centre for Training and 
Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG), the Urban Protection Dispositive (DPU), 
and psychological warfare organizations (the cinquièmes bureaux).17   
French theorists extolled indigenous paramilitaries’ value at the same time as they 
developed practices for separating populations from insurgents.  Over time, France’s military 
employed large numbers of auxiliaries, including: spahis, goums, moghazenis, harkis, partisans, 
militias, garde civile and GMPRs.18  This propensity for indigenous forces has two 
explanations.  One lies in auxiliaries’ superior ability to track guerillas because of their “more 
rustic and lighter” nature compared with regular forces.19  The second rationale lies in France’s 
tactic of quadrillage (“gridding”), which employs large static forces to control population 
centers and transportation arteries.  French counterinsurgency theorists from Gallieni to Beaufre 
argued that the incremental deployment of quadrillage across a territory constitutes a necessary 
precondition for French forces to “rally” populations.20  Paramilitaries became essential because 
France’s metropole never provided enough forces for these tasks.21 
In addition to large numbers of mediocre quadrillage troops, French theorists argued 
that they needed elite infantry to pursue and destroy rebel bands.  A veritable French obsession 
with guerrilla-hunting units can indeed be traced back to the early stages of France’s conquest 
                                                          
17 Tramor Quemeneur, “’La discipline jusque dans l’indiscipline’ La désobéissance de 
militaires français en faveur de l’Algérie française,” In Mohammed Harbi & Benjamin Stora, 
eds., La Guerre d’Algérie, 1954-2004 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2004), 173-76. 
18Recrutement des Indigènes Nord-Africains et des Formations Auxiliaires de l'Afrique 
du Nord (Paris: Ministère de la Guerre, 1934); and Christophe Cazorla, "Le concept d’emploi 
des supplétifs dans la guerre d’Algerie," Revue historique des armées No.4 (2002), 69-82. 
19 Colonel Fabre, La Tactique au Maroc (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1931), 212. 
20 Beaufre, 75. 
21 Paul Ely, "Enseignements de la Guerre d’Indochine," 1955 Trans. In Rand 
Memorandum RM-5271-PR (Santa Monica: Rand, 1967), 54-64; and Gortzak, 316-19. 
9 
 
of Algeria.  Unable to catch insurgents, Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud formed fast-
marching columns of “picked” volunteers, supported by rugged pack mules and lightweight 
artillery, beginning in 1836.22  Bugeaud argued that only such units could employ his “system 
of mobile and incessant warfare” to triumph over guerrillas.23  Gallieni later theorized that rapid 
columns of this sort perform the action vive or “energetic actions”, such as destroying rebel 
bands, needed to complement the progressive pacification of territories through action lente.24   
The task of pursuing and defeating mobile guerrillas across rugged terrain remains 
highly challenging for military organizations.  Bugeaud’s lightly-equipped forces sought to 
achieve this by out-marching and outmaneuvering insurgents.  Lyautey, however, argued that 
elite units must also harness emerging technologies.25  French elite forces thus inaugurated a 
tradition of capitalizing on the most modern means of transportation to better come to grips 
with guerrillas, including gunboats in Tonkin, armored cars in Morocco and helicopters in 
Algeria.  Over time, the elite units and their novel technologies acquired a mythic status within 
France’s Army.  General Marcel Bigeard lyrically described the physical and moral 
characteristics of an elite airmobile unit of his day in the following terms, "An agile, light, feline 
and maneuverable battalion that possesses an unshakeable faith."26   
France’s counterinsurgency practices’ long development ensured that they enjoyed 
widespread support within the military establishment.  This does not signify, however, that all 
French field commanders embraced this “French school” of population centric 
                                                          
22 "Le maréchal de camp BUGEAUD à M. le Maréchal ministre de la Guerre," 16 juin 
1836. Rpt In Paul Azan, ed., Par L’Epée et par la Charrue: Ecrits et Discours de Bugeaud 
(Paris: PUF, 1948), 1-5. 
23 “Le général BUGEAUD à THIERS,” 27 juin 1842. Rpt. In Azan, 136-37. 
24 Gallieni, Trois Colonnes au Tonkin, 156-57. 
25 Lyautey, "Du Role Colonial de l’Armée," 310. 
26 Marcel Bigeard, Pour une parcelle de gloire (Plon: Paris, 1975), 102. 
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counterinsurgency.  Marshall Philippe-Henri Pétain during the Riff War (1925-27) and General 
René Cogny in Indochina (1950-54), for example, sought to force their opponents to fight 
conventional combined-arms battles.  Louis Archinard, meanwhile, employed a punitive and 
brutalizing approach in Mali, executing hostages and displacing populations.27  Archinard, 
furthermore, imbibed his subordinates with this philosophy, ultimately inspiring Captain Paul 
Voulet’s and Lieutenant Jules Chanoine’s murderous romp across the Sahel in 1898-99.28 
Aside from these exceptions, however, the French military’s counterinsurgency culture 
remains widespread and deeply rooted.  Scholars, indeed, trace a continuous intellectual 
tradition from Bugeaud’s 1836 arrival in Algeria to Galula’s writings after Algeria’s 
independence in 1962.  This tradition, moreover, embraced many of the French Army’s leading 
lights throughout this period, including Antoine Huré, Georges Catroux and Jean-Jacques 
Mordacq, in addition to the Gallieni and Lyautey.29  Perhaps it is unsurprising under these 
circumstances that most French officers blamed the defeats in Indochina (1945-54) and Algeria 
(1954-62) on either the poor execution of tactics or political leaders’ miscalculations rather than 
any inherent flaws with French counterinsurgency practices.  Military leaders therefore 
continue to conceptualize counterinsurgencies in terms of this doctrinal repertoire of: 
militarizing civil governance; population controls and psychological warfare; raising 
indigenous paramilitary forces; and aggressive attacks by elite units.     
France’s counterinsurgency “school” not only remains popular in France, but 
disproportionately impacts Anglo-American debates as well.  Jean Gottmann’s chapter in 
Edward Mead’s 1943 Makers of Modern Strategy set French practices apart as uniquely worthy 
                                                          
27 Albert Lorofi, La vie quotidienne des officiers de l’infanterie de marine pendant la 
conquête de la colonie du Soudan français (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008), 67-74. 
28 Bertrand Taithe, The Killer Trail: A Colonial Scandal in the Heart of Africa 
(Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
29 Rid; and Finch, 230-37. 
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of study.30  Translations of Jean Larteguy’s novels then provided subsequent generations with 
a romanticized vision of anti-guerrilla operations.  While Larteguy’s fiction reached masses, 
didactic works spoke to more specialized readerships. Consequently, Trinquier’s translated La 
Guerre Moderne exposed readers to France’s population control measures and Galula’s 
publication of Counterinsurgency Warfare in English provided a distillation of French 
counterinsurgency thought.31  Publication in English set Galula and Trinquier up to re-emerge 
as the only non-British or American authors referenced in the 2006 U.S. Army/Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual.32   
 
Counterinsurgencies and Civil-Military Crises 
Although France’s distinctive counterinsurgency practices enjoyed widespread support 
within the military establishment, the Fifth Republic’s political leaders considered these same 
practices inimical to civilian control of the nation’s armed forces.  Campaigns of colonial 
pacification all too often escaped the control of France’s democratically-elected leaders, 
saddling them with unwanted conquests and military commitments.  The French military’s 
further evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine later contributed to civil-military crises during 
France’s wars of decolonization.   
Experts have long recognized that expeditionary counterinsurgency operations are 
corrosive to good civil-military relations and have advanced three arguments explaining why.  
The problem lies, for principle-agent theory’s proponents, in the difficulty that political 
                                                          
30 Jean Gottmann,”Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: the development of French colonial 
warfare,” in Edward Earle ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from 
Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1943), 234-259. 
31 Bertrand Valeyre and Alexandre Guérin, De Galula à Petraeus, l'héritage français 
dans la pensée américaine de la contre-insurrection (Paris: CDEF, 2009), 24-55. 
32 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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“principals” face in controlling their military “agents” when the latter conduct complex 
counterinsurgency operations abroad.33  According to a second group of scholars, 
counterinsurgencies tempt armed forces to substitute their authority for that of their civilian 
masters by gradually eroding clear distinctions between military and civilian roles.34  A third 
group contends that “internal security” doctrines prompt military interventions in politics by 
redefining the armed forces’ missions to include such intangible goals as defending a nation’s 
moral health.35  Civil-military scholars thus agree that counterinsurgencies undermine civilian 
leaders’ control over their armed forces although they differ on exactly why this occurs.   
However, as will be shown, French armed forces’ distinctive practices aggravated the 
civil-military tensions that counterinsurgencies produce.  For example, while civilian leaders 
invariably have trouble evaluating counterinsurgency operations because of the absence of clear 
metrics for measuring success, this quandary was accentuated in France by the armed forces’ 
insistence that autonomous commanders should wield supreme authority over all of 
counterinsurgencies’ military and civilian components.  Expressing this normative belief, 
Lyautey asserted that, “The first act of any commanding general operating at 3,000 leagues 
[from the homeland] should be to cut the telegraph wire to free himself from the metropole’s 
harassing instructions.”36 
French field commanders often abused the autonomy conferred upon them to pursue 
agendas at variance with their orders.  A.S. Kanya-Forstner, for example, demonstrates how 
                                                          
33 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 2003). 
34 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998); and Charles Dunlap, “The Origins of the 
American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters (Winter 1992-93), 2-20. 
35 Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999). 
36 Lyautey à sa sœur, 9 February 1895, cited in Gillet, 63. 
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careerism and pro-colonial ideologies drove 19th-century commanders to overstep their 
mandates and conquer territories that were neither profitable nor desired by France’s 
government.37  Lyautey, likewise, sparked an international crisis that nearly led to a European 
war with his unauthorized occupation of Moroccan territory.38  These abuses, grave as they are, 
pale in comparison to commanders’ actions during the 1954-62 Algerian War.  Field 
commanders twice sabotaged government efforts to negotiate an end of the war, first by 
intercepting the aircraft carrying rebel leaders to peace negotiations in 1956 and, second, by 
bombing a village in Tunisia in 1958.39  France’s commander in Algeria, Raoul Salan, exploited 
the domestic upheaval following the latter incident to overthrow France’s Fourth Republic. 
The French military’s population control and psychological warfare practices provided 
officers with both a rationale and tools for further intervening in politics.  To counter insurgents’ 
calls to fight for independence, military propagandists promised to fully-integrate Muslim 
Algerians into French political life and dramatically raise their standard of living.  Successive 
governments’ unwillingness to commit themselves to this objective—or indeed offer an 
unambiguous vision of the future—prompted officers to impose their preferences on the 
government.40  Their counterinsurgency techniques, meanwhile, widened the range of tools 
they possess for shaping public opinion and governance.41  The officers who plotted the May 
                                                          
37 A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sahara: A Study in French 
Military Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969). 
38 Kim Munholland, “Rival Approaches to Morocco: Delcassé, Lyautey, and the 
Algerian-Moroccan Border,” French Historical Studies 5/3 (1968), 328-43. 
39 Irwin Wall, “De Gaulle, the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ and the Algerian War,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 25/2 (2002), 118-37. 
40 Raoul Girardet, “Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic,” in Samuel 
Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962), 135-
39.  
41 George Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947–1962 
(Cambridge: MIT, 1965). 
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1958 coup, for example, merely turned the techniques and institutions of psychological action 
against France’s elected government.  In one example, Trinquier employed the DPU, originally 
developed for ferreting-out terrorists, to mobilize Algeria’s population against its elected 
leaders.42  Afterwards, proponents of psychological action and population control, such as 
colonels Antoine Argoud, Charles Lacherory and Yves Godard, directed the 1961 coup attempt 
against Charles de Gaulle and then led the Organisation Armée Secrète‘s terror campaign.43 
Even France’s heavy use of paramilitary forces contributed to its civil-military 
problems.  Officers developed deep emotional ties with the local paramilitaries they led and felt 
personally responsible for their well-being.  Such bonds generated conflicting loyalties 
whenever French governments adopted policies prejudicial to auxiliaries’ interests.44  Officers 
who served with local auxilliaries, for example, were more likely to participate in the 1958 and 
1961 putsches in Algeria than those who did not.45  Hélie de Saint Marc, one of the 1961 
putsch’s participants, expressed this sentiment when he wrote, “When General Challe spoke to 
me [about joining the putsch], I remembered… the day in 1948 when I agreed to lead partisans 
from Talung [in Indochina] and again felt my disgrace [about abandoning them]….  A man 
who consciously betrays other men is a criminal.”46 
The elite paratroop and Foreign Legion units that played prominent roles in France’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine also spearheaded the military’s interventions into politics.  These 
units’ continuous engagement in mobile anti-guerrilla operations severed their contact with 
                                                          
42 Pierre Abramovici, Le Putsch des Généraux: De Gaulle contre l’armée 1958-1961 
(Paris: Fayard, 2011), 72-88. 
43 Quemeneur, 173-79. 
44 Philippe Pottier, “GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during 
the French Indochina War,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 16/2(2005), 125-46. 
45 Paul-Marie de La Gorce, La République et son Armée (Paris: Fayard, 1963), 654. 
46 Hélie de Saint Marc, Mémoire : Les champs de braises (Paris: Perrin, 1995), 265. 
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civil society.  The Foreign Legion’s professional nature and its soldiers’ cosmopolitan 
backgrounds exacerbated this problem further, rendering soldiers liable to uncritically follow 
officers into political adventures.47  French elite soldiers therefore developed belief systems that 
elevated military considerations over obedience to political leaders and transformed France’s 
elite into the praetorian “lost soldiers” that overthrew the Fourth Republic and nearly did 
likewise to its successor.48 
In sum, France’s distinctive counterinsurgency practices undermined civilian leaders’ 
control of the armed forces.  Military commanders consequently pursued private objectives at 
the expense of the government’s foreign policy during the late-19th and early-20th centuries’ 
campaigns of imperial pacification.  These same counterinsurgency practices later turned parts 
of the armed forces into a danger to French democracy during the Algeria War.  In short, 
although counterinsurgencies frequently strain civil-military relations, France’s practices were 
particularly deleterious and provoked the most serious civil-military crises experienced by an 
advanced modern democracy.   
 
Civil-Military Control Institutions 
French leaders considered the armed force’s counterinsurgency practices a threat from 
the Fifth Republic’s foundation in 1958.  It was in the name of counterinsurgency doctrine, 
indeed, that some of France’s most decorated officers and premier units overthrew the Fourth 
Republic, attempted to overthrow the Fifth and waged a terrorist campaign against the state.  
De Gaulle’s new government ensured itself against any recurrence of France’s civil-military 
                                                          
47 Eckard Michels, “From One Crisis to Another: The Morale of the French Foreign 
Legion during the Algerian War,” In Martin Alexander et al., eds., The Algerian War and the 
French Army, 1954-62 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 96-99. 
48 Quemeneur, 176; and Abramovici, 284. 
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crises by developing institutions to curtail the armed forces’ autonomy and by subjecting them 
to an unprecedented degree of political control. 
De Gaulle personally believed that the key to viable civil-military relations lay in 
reorienting France’s army from population-centered counterinsurgency to conventional 
military operations.  De Gaulle told close collaborators towards the Algerian War’s conclusion 
that, “That’s enough with colonial wars.  We are having all the problems in the world extricating 
ourselves from the one in Algeria [1954-62] and I do not want to engage in a new one.”49  He 
therefore enjoined officers to shift their intellectual focus from counterinsurgency to the 
combined arms maneuvers and tactical nuclear strikes needed to defend against the Soviet 
Union.  De Gaulle told colleagues repeatedly that he would “return the army to the Rhine” and 
“end the [army’] focus on Algeria.”50  De Gaulle, therefore, reconfigured most of the Army for 
high-intensity warfare and promoted atomic strategists, such as Charles Ailleret and Paul 
Stehlin, at the expense of counterinsurgency specialists.51   
French foreign policy, however, precluded an exclusive focus on the Soviet threat.  De 
Gaulle’s desire to preserve France’s African sphere of influence—codified in military 
cooperation agreements concluded with all of France’s Sub-Saharan ex-colonies except 
Guinea—obliged France to intervene in more African conflicts than any other power.52  
France’s 1972 Defense White Paper articulated France’s intervention doctrine, by defining 
French overseas interests in Africa as the “third circle” of French security, whose defense would 
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be guaranteed by military units permanently deployed to African bases.53  This policy ensured, 
however, that France’s armed forces would again fight insurgents far away from France’s 
metropole since intra-state conflicts pose the primary threat to this third circle.54   
De Gaulle and his colleagues recognized how detrimental prior counterinsurgencies had 
been to French civil-military relations and wanted to avoid any recurrence of past problems.  
They therefore developed four institutional strategies for better controlling the armed forces 
during interventions.  These include: 1) the creation of a powerful civilian Secretariat in Paris; 
2) the appointment of special ambassadors to oversee interventions; 3) civilianizing 
interventions’ non-combat functions; and 4) creating parallel military staffs to maximize 
civilian leaders’ options.   
The first strategy involved designating civilian, rather than military leaders, to oversee 
military interventions’ political and military facets.  De Gaulle inaugurated this policy during 
the Algerian War in 1958 by appointing civilian fonctionnaire Paul Delouvrier to replace 
General Salan as France’s proconsul in Algeria.55  Although de Gaulle viewed Delouvrier’s 
appointment as a temporary expedient, he also developed more permanent structures to ensure 
a similar level of oversight over future interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
To this end, he established a General Secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs 
staffed by 150 personnel.56  Institutionally, de Gaulle’s creation of this Secretariat set France’s 
Africa policy apart from its policies towards other continents by subordinating the former 
directly to France’s Presidency while the Foreign Ministry oversaw the latter.  De Gaulle 
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reinforced the Secretariat’s importance by appointing one of his closest collaborators, Jacques 
Foccart, to oversee it in 1960.57  Foccart’s discretion and loyalty earned him unrivaled access 
to de Gaulle, including daily meetings, after de Gaulle’s ascension to the Presidency.  Foccart’s 
stature thus ensured that the position of the French President’s General Secretary for African 
and Malagasy Affairs, otherwise known as the President’s “Monsieur Afrique”, would remain 
powerful under his successors.     
Foccart and his Secretariat drew on a repertoire of institutions and procedures for 
managing interventions.  The Secretariat benefited from its outset from a close partnership with 
the French intelligence service’s section specializing in African affairs (Sector “N” of the 
SDECE).58  Through both Sector N and his own personal networks, Foccart orchestrated 
clandestine activities, ranging from coups to mercenary operations, without calling upon 
France’s regular military.  Foccart and his successors also appointed hand-picked “special” 
ambassadors for states whenever the local political situation deteriorated beyond a certain 
threshold.59  French governments could then give these ambassadors pro-consular authority 
over military forces in the eventuality of French interventions.60      
French leaders’ third institutional strategy for controlling future military interventions 
was narrowly circumscribing the armed forces’ role.  Whereas soldiers hitherto undertook many 
functions normally performed by civilian bodies, France’s government now “civilianized” 
counterinsurgencies’ non-combat components.  To this end, they administratively separated 
counterinsurgencies’ military and political aspects, and entrusted the latter to civil service 
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personnel.61  This role differentiation limited the armed forces’ responsibility for interventions’ 
outcomes and their contact with local populations. 
The government’s fourth new mechanism was a "divide and rule" system embodied in 
parallel inter-service military staffs that maximize political leaders’ ability to control 
interventions from Paris.  In addition to the armed forces' Joint Staff (EMA), France's president 
controls his private military staff (EMP), the prime minister seeks military advice from his 
general secretariat for national defense (SGDN) and the minister of defense solicits options 
from his military cabinet.  Thus, rather than dealing with a monolithic military hierarchy, rival 
inter-service staffs generate multiple recommendations and enable political leaders to select 
those options most consonant with their preferences.62 
There are powerful reasons for anticipating that the enhanced civilian control that these 
institutions were designed to achieve would also alter the French interventions’ fundamental 
character.  A long tradition of social science research demonstrates that civilian policymakers 
possess preferences different from those of military commanders on how to employ force.63  In 
contrast to military leaders’ preference for employing maximum force to achieve decisive 
victories, political decision-makers are rarely willing to spend more economic or military 
capital than needed to obtain a high-probability of success.  As one scholar observed, military 
commanders prefer to optimize the probability of victory through overwhelming force, while 
civilian leaders tend to “satisfice” by reducing commitments to the minimal levels needed to 
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attain their goals.64  The type of war that states wage thus depends on whose preferences—
political leaders’ or military commanders’—prevail when it comes to designing a campaign. 
As Deborah Avant demonstrates, variations between states’ political institutions shape 
politicians’ ability to impose their preferences.65  De Gaulle’s development of sweeping civil-
military control institutions, within this context, should logically result in operations reflecting 
their desiderata to an exceptional degree.  As a result, rather than seeking victory, national 
leaders are likely to limit their aims to advancing narrowly-defined interests.  Since intervening 
states can frequently achieve objectives such as reassuring allies and deterring rivals without 
winning decisively, the Fifth Republic’s leaders can be expected to minimize the resources they 
commit and to guard against open-ended engagements.  Political leaders’ propensity for 
strategic satisficing leads them to intersperse military operations with diplomatic negotiations 
because continuous communication is a prerequisite for resolving conflicts in the absence of 
military victory.66 
In sum, the Fifth Republic’s founding leaders developed institutions to enhance civilian 
control over military operations.  They attempted this by: appointing civilian proconsuls to 
oversee interventions, civilianizing counterinsurgencies’ non-military components, and 
exploiting rivalries between parallel inter-service staffs.  These institutions will, if successful 
at their original objective, likely alter the fundamental nature of French counterinsurgencies.  
Operations would, in theory, be characterized by civilian proconsuls overseeing the combined 
use of diplomacy and minimal force to achieve limited objectives.  However, the question 
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remains as to whether French military culture or policymaking institutions exercise a greater 
impact on the Fifth Republic’s counterinsurgencies since the military establishment’s existing  
practices clash with the Fifth Republic’s civil-military dynamics.  
 
Case Selection 
France’s armed forces’ ingrained counterinsurgency practices and the Fifth Republic’s 
civil-military institutions yield very different predictions about how France’s Fifth Republic 
conducts counterinsurgencies.  Perhaps nowhere are these distinctions starker than on the twin 
questions of who—civilian or military leaders—controls interventions and whether they will 
conduct brief or protracted campaigns.  If military culture is the most important factor, then 
recent French counterinsurgencies should strongly resemble preceding ones, with military 
proconsuls progressively pacifying rebellious territories.  If the Fifth Republics civil-military 
institutions are predominant, then different dynamics of political micromanagement and 
strategic satisficing should prevail. 
Besides differing on counterinsurgencies’ direction and duration, military culture and 
civil-military institutions suggest different mechanisms for France to achieve its objectives.  De 
Gaulle designed the Fifth Republic’s civil-military institutions to facilitate the closely-coupled 
application of diplomacy and military force.  Policymakers can be expected, under these 
circumstances, to employ careful doses of limited forces to reassure allies and coerce enemies 
into negotiating.  The French militaries’ counterinsurgency culture, contrarily, privileges the 
gradual, yet inexorable application of action lente to pacify populations and action vive to 
annihilate recalcitrant guerrilla bands.  The military, within this context, achieves victory by 
spreading a network of quadrillage forces across a territory and then subjecting inhabitants to 
population control and psychological warfare campaigns. 
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French scholars themselves disagree about whether civil-military institutions or military 
culture plays a greater role.  Vincent Joly and Raphaël Granvaud emphasize continuities 
between earlier counterinsurgencies and France’s recent African interventions.67  Samy Cohen 
and Jean Guisnel, contrarily, contend that the Fifth Republic’s institutions promote civilian 
micromanagement of military operations.68 
Answering this question about how France conducts counterinsurgencies has powerful 
implications for scholars and policymakers alike.  France has, by any measure, conducted more 
military interventions than any state, besides the United States, since the Second World War.  
The most authoritative list chronicles 309 distinct French military operations conducted abroad 
since 1945.69  Many of these operations were small, ranging from disaster relief to evacuating 
French citizens from conflict zones.  France is nonetheless remarkably militarily proactive, even 
taking into account the large numbers of small operations.  
French interventionism is particularly significant for Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
accounts for 44 percent of France’s interventions.70  France’s propensity for African 
interventions and other states hesitancy to engage in Africa makes France Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
most important external security actor.  French forces, indeed, played a key role at many critical 
junctures, from suppressing a 1977-78 uprising threatening Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko 
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to driving Al Qaeda from Timbuktu in 2013.  Table I below illustrates the 14 African 
counterinsurgency operations France conducted under the Fifth Republic.71 
Table I: 
Fifth Republic Interventions in African Civil Wars 
Dates Name(s) of Operation Location Personnel 
1958-1959 Op. Ecouvillon Western Sahara 5,000 
1969-1972 Op. Limousin Chad 2,851 
1977-1980 Op. Lamantin Mauritania 350* 
1977-1978 Ops. Verveine/Bonite Zaire 400* 
1978-1982 Op. Tacaud Chad 2,600 
1983-1984 Op. Manta Chad 3,500 
1986-2014 Op. Epervier Chad 3,000 
1990-1993 Op. Noroît Rwanda 300 
1996 Ops. Almandin 1-3 Central African Republic 2,500 
1998-1999 Op. Iroko Guinea-Bissau 74 
2002-2015 Op. Licorne Ivory Coast 5,000 
2003-present Op. Boali Central African Republic 300 
2013-2014 Op. Serval Mali  4,000 
2013-2016 Op. Sangaris Central African Republic 2,000 
* signifies that statistics include only ground forces 
 
The frequency and effectiveness of France’s interventions lead many to regard France as 
Africa’s de facto gendarme.72  Understanding how a medium-size country like France 
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intervenes militarily so often at so little political or economic cost to itself is thus of a more 
general interest to international relations scholars.   
Evaluating the relative impact of military culture and civil-military institutions on 
France’s African interventions is however unavoidably complex because of the need to 
ascertain both the nature of what France did as well as the policymaking process that resulted 
in those actions.  Accomplishing this within an article’s confines privileges a single case study 
rather than addressing multiple cases in insufficient detail.  Arguably, France’s 1969-72 
intervention in Chad stands out as an ideal case study for this endeavour because of its unique 
combination of representativeness, salience and available sources.   
In terms of representativeness, the 2,851 personnel committed to this intervention place 
it exceptionally close to the mean (2,831 personnel) for the African counterinsurgencies 
involving combat by French ground forces.73  This intervention is also particularly salient today 
because of France’s rediscovery of it as a “successful” counterinsurgency.  Colonel Michel 
Goya, indeed, argues in official publications and popular magazines alike that France conducted 
an “exemplary counterinsurgency” and won a “forgotten victory” in Chad.74 
France’s 1969-72 Chad intervention offers additional advantages as a case study in 
terms of the range of primary sources accessible.  Triangulation amongst different categories 
of documents is invaluable when it comes to penetrating civil-military planning processes that 
are rarely articulated in memoirs.  Declassifications, within this context, enable me draw on 
four categories of documents, including: military documents accessed at France’s Service 
Historique de la Défense (SHD); the military’s internal study, Les Interventions Militaires 
Françaises au Tchad (IMFT); French diplomatic documents from Documents Diplomatiques 
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Français (DDF); and external British assessments from The National Archives (TNA).  I further 
draw on published Chadian and French journals and interviews conducted with France’s former 
ambassador to Chad to provide the most comprehensive account yet of this intervention. 
In sum, France’s 1969-72 Chad intervention constitutes the best case for assessing 
whether the military’s counterinsurgency culture or the Fifth Republic’s institutions play a 
greater role in shaping French interventions in African conflicts.  This article tests these 
hypotheses by successively examining four phases of France’s intervention where civilian and 
military preferences clashed, including: France’s initial decision to intervene, how France 
structured its intervention, how decision-makers integrated diplomatic and military initiatives, 
and finally how France’s government disengaged its forces.  A subsequent section then assesses 
whether conclusions drawn from this case hold true for subsequent interventions despite 
communications technologies’ development and the French public’s increasingly positive 
opinion of their armed forces.   
 
Choosing to Intervene 
France’s colonial policies and miscalculations by Chad’s post-independence leaders 
sparked an insurgency that engulfed Chad by 1968 and threatened to overthrow the government.  
Because Chad’s borders are the product of competing French, Anglo-Egyptian and Italian 
imperialisms, the state encompasses three distinct populations—Christian/animist farmers, 
Muslim farmers and Muslim nomads—each of which includes numerous tribes.75  The colonial 
state’s burdens of compulsory labor and military conscription, however, fell heaviest on the 
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Christian/animist Sara ethnicity of southern Chad.76  It was one of these Sara, François 
Tombalbaye, who won the presidential elections France organized as it withdrew and then 
exploited his new-found power to redistribute resources to his own people.77 
Discriminatory policies and excessive taxation drove Chadian Muslims to revolt in 
1965.  Chad’s 3,000 solders responded by burning villages and slaughtering livestock, which 
only drove more Chadians to join the rebellion.78  Exiles, foremost amongst whom was Ibrahim 
Abatcha, federated this emerging resistance under the aegis of the Front de Liberation Nationale 
du Tchad (Chad Liberation Front or FROLINAT).79  The traditional leader of northern Chad’s 
nomadic Tubu ethnic group, the Derdeï meanwhile entered into dissidence in 1966.80  Foreign 
support—from North Korea, Egypt, Syria and Sudan—then fueled FROLINAT’s growth such 
that only Tombalbaye’s ethnic power base in southern Chad remained loyal by mid-1968.81   
The process by which France came to intervene in this conflict witnessed the systematic 
elevation of civilian over military expertise, and the privileging of diplomatic over tactical 
considerations.  French political leaders initially had little desire to intervene because Chad was 
one of France’s poorest ex-colonies and its hostile terrain and warlike inhabitants led many to 
consider the country a quagmire.  Francophone African leaders, however, urged de Gaulle to 
support Tombalbaye because they viewed Chad as a test of whether France would uphold its 
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commitments to other allies.  Madagascar’s President Philibert Tsiranana and Niger’s Hamani 
Diori led the way in trying to persuade French leaders that their African allies would lose faith 
in France’s security guarantees if France refused to intervene.82       
Tombalbaye, for his part, openly courted other partners.  After failing to convince the 
superpowers to provide aid, Tombalbaye found an eager supporter in Israel.  Israel provided 
development assistance from 1964 onwards in exchange for Chadian diplomatic support at the 
United Nations.83  Israeli leaders later expanded their aid program to win Tombalbaye’s support 
for efforts to destabilize its enemies by supplying arms to Sudan’s Anya-Nya rebels and 
sponsoring Prince Abdallah al-Abid al-Senoussi’s plan to invade Muammar Gaddafi’s anti-
Zionist regime.84  Israel thus progressed from organizing Tombalbaye’s youth movement to its 
paramilitary security force, and finally its commando units.85   
This background, of Francophone African leaders urging intervention and Israel 
threatening France’s preeminence in Chad, provided the background for French leaders’ 
debates on whether to intervene.  Although French policymakers regarded Chad as a quagmire 
with little intrinsic value, key actors had already concluded that France needed to do more. De 
Gaulle’s Secretary General for African Affairs, Jacques Foccart argued as early as 1967 that, 
“Soon we will have to take responsibility for this [Chadian] situation if we want to prevent 
matters from becoming more toxic.”86  De Gaulle himself observed in early 1968 that, “Chad 
constitutes a section of one wall in our [African] edifice.  It is a rotten bit of wall, but it is one 
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that must nonetheless be kept upright.”87  France’s debate on whether to intervene came to a 
head on 25 August 1968 when Tombalbaye invoked the 1960 Franco-Chadian treaty to request 
military assistance.88 
France’s government initially responded to unrest in Chad by dispatching a senior civil 
servant.  On behalf of de Gaulle, Foccart, took the initiative of replacing the career diplomat 
representing France with a special ambassador better qualified for Chad’s burgeoning civil war 
in January 1968.89  This special ambassador, Fernand Wibaux, a Foccart loyalist, had developed 
expertise in clandestine operations while in the French Resistance.  Wibaux, in turn, determined 
that France needed to act militarily when Tubu rebels encircled the Chadian Army garrison at 
Aozou.  He advocated a short, swift operation to save the Aozou garrison as a means of shoring-
up Tombalbaye’s regime and reassuring France’s other African ex-colonies.90   France’s Joint 
Military Staff under General Michel Fourquet, however, opposed intervening and argued that 
Chad could become a quagmire.91   
France’s cabinet weighed Wibaux’s and Fourquet’s recommendations and sided with 
Wibaux, ordering a company of French paratroops to break the rebel siege of Aozou.  De Gaulle 
personally specified that this intervention “will have a limited duration and we cannot envision 
stationing our forces permanently in Tibesti.”92  The paratroops were quickly dispatched and 
accomplished their mission in two weeks without suffering casualties.  A token force of five 
French counter-insurgency aircraft—piston engined Skyraiders—then deployed to northern 
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Chad to deter further rebel attacks as the paratroops withdrew.93  These actions, however, failed 
to improve Chad’s security, which paradoxically deteriorated even faster as a result of France’s 
intervention.  The Aozou garrison, indeed, mutinied and abandoned their post rather than 
remain once the siege had been lifted.94 
This act of indiscipline emboldened rebels throughout Chad.  Rebel ranks soon swelled 
to 2,330 personnel who launched 227 attacks during the first half of 1969 alone.95  Rebel forces 
with soaring morale, yet poor armaments began defeating Chadian forces in conventional 
engagements, repulsing the government’s “Mokofi” offensive in January 1969 and annihilating 
a quarter of Chad’s gendarmerie in March.96  France’s handful of attack aircraft failed to arrest 
this dynamic because pilots failed to spot rebels on the ground and Chadian soldiers proved 
unskilled at guiding them by radio.97   
Wibaux responded to these events by lobbying for another limited intervention.  
Calculating that French forces could quickly destroy FROLINAT’s ill-equipped guerrillas in 
central Chad, Wibaux paved the way for a concerted civil-military effort to consolidate the 
Chadian government’s control over Chad’s most populous and prosperous provinces.  
Wibaux’s renewed calls to intervene met with persistent hostility from the Joint Military Staff.  
Two civilian policymakers, Foccart and Cooperation Minister Yvon Bourges, travelled to Chad 
on the government’s behalf to assess the situation and rallied to Wibaux’s point-of-view.98  De 
Gaulle and his cabinet validated this delegation’s assessment and began organizing France’s 
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military intervention.  It was thus on the basis of civilian policymakers’ judgements and against 
military objections that France deployed forces.   
 
Organizing the Intervention 
Having elected to deploy combat troops, France’s government endowed Wibaux with 
proconsular power to manage all of the intervention’s political and military components.  While 
Wibaux’s elevation guaranteed civilian supremacy on the ground in Chad, the government 
further limited the armed forces’ autonomy by clearly distinguishing between the campaign’s 
military and administrative aspects.  Authority over counterinsurgency activities was invested 
in two distinct bodies: combat forces under a Military Delegation (DM) and a civilian-run 
Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA).  While a military officer led the former institution, 
a civilian functionary controlled the latter.   
Although such a division of labor may appear straightforward, counterinsurgencies 
notoriously blur distinctions between civil and military activities.  France’s government, 
therefore, defined the MRA’s role as broadly as possible and the DM’s as narrowly as feasible.  
It was the MRA that consequently was given the lead role in: increasing Muslims’ 
representation within Chad’s administration, re-empowering traditional rulers, digging village 
wells, and building schools.  France’s government even granted the MRA authority over 
Chadian paramilitary forces, which the DM desperately wanted to control because of the role 
such indigenous forces played in the military’s counterinsurgency doctrine.99  French 
policymakers, in short, entrusted the MRA with managing the “hearts and minds” campaign 
central to defeating Chad’s insurgents.  Thus, although force was deemed essential for 
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achieving France’s objectives, the armed forces would be monitored and circumscribed via 
institutional arrangements privileging civilian authority.100  
De Gaulle’s advisors took great care to select pliant field commanders in addition to 
institutionally circumscribing the armed forces’ role.  One of France’s most distinguished 
soldiers, General Marcel Bigeard, had already been promised command of African 
operations.101  However, Bigeard was both a media icon because of his exploits in Indochina 
and Algeria and an adherent to the counterinsurgency doctrines that had proven so toxic to civil-
military relations.102   
The French cabinet feared that Bigeard would operate too autonomously and therefore 
handpicked another commander.  This officer, Brigadier-General Michel Arnaud, was judged 
more amenable to political directives and less popular with the media.  The French government 
emphasized the DM’s subordinate role in its instructions to Arnaud declaring that, “The place 
you occupy in the French military hierarchy in Chad makes you the ‘military adjutant’ to 
France’s ambassador.  Your job is to suggest to the Ambassador means for obtaining a given 
objective and giving the orders necessary for a mission’s accomplishment upon the 
Ambassador’s request.”103 
These command arrangements initially satisfied all parties.  Upon arriving in Chad, 
Arnaud used his French forces (1,390 personnel in mid-1969) as a strike force to destroy rebel 
concentrations.  He ordered two Foreign Legion companies to eradicate guerrilla bands in Guera 
province.  The rebels’ overconfidence after repeatedly defeating poorly-trained Chadian forces 
led them to commit the fatal error of attacking the Legionnaires, which led to its comprehensive 
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defeat in 24-29 April 1969.104  This victory psychologically stunned the rebels, who became 
less aggressive throughout central Chad.  However, the Foreign Legion's success created 
problems of its own.  Rebels now eschewed contact with French forces, which in turn lacked 
the numbers to oblige rebels to fight.105 
French forces’ inability to bring rebels to battle soon generated friction between Arnaud 
and his civilian superiors.  Arnaud planned to establish a web of village militias as per the 
French doctrine of progressively extending quadrillage across a territory.  Wibaux, for his part, 
considered militias and other irregular forces indispensable to both Chadian administrators’ 
authority and reestablishing traditional rulers’ authority.106  He therefore subordinated militias 
to the civilian-run MRA rather than Arnaud’s command.107  Arnaud excoriated this arrangement 
for undermining his ability to enact the action lente considered so essential to 
counterinsurgencies.  Worse still from Arnaud’s perspective, Chadian administrators and rulers 
employed the militias provided by the MRA to bully villagers.108   
Arnaud’s relations with other members of the Franco-Chadian military committee 
deteriorated during the summer of 1969 over both the militia issue and other command 
decisions.109  His proposal to withdraw garrisons from two northern prefectures, for example, 
alienated both Tombalbaye and Wibaux, who worried about the psychological implications of 
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“ceding” territory to the rebellion.110  Arnaud then clashed with Tombalbaye and Chadian 
commanders over Chadian forces’ use of indiscriminant violence, which Arnaud argued drove 
more Chadian villagers to join the rebellion.  Arnaud thereafter lobbied for greater authority 
over Chadian units.  Matters reached a climax when General Arnaud and President Tombalbaye 
publicly shouted at one another after Tombalbaye advocated massacring 15,000 pro-
FROLINAT villagers in August 1969.111 
Arnaud’s poor relations with the MRA and the Franco-Chadian military committee 
prompted Wibaux to obtain his removal on 8 August 1969.112  Wibaux dramatically 
demonstrated the predominance of civilian over military authority with this act.  While Arnaud 
had quarreled with his civilian and Chadian counterparts, he had done so on behalf of the 
Army’s cherished counterinsurgency principles and international human rights law.   
Within this context, Arnaud’s drive to control Chadian paramilitary forces reflected his 
desire to replicate the military-dominated command structures of past counterinsurgencies.  The 
French armed forces’ internal investigation concluded as much, finding Arnaud’s conduct 
irreproachable.113  The fact that French political authorities relieved Arnaud under such 
circumstances demonstrated their willingness to punish commanders for the mere act of 
disagreeing with their political superiors.  French commanders, within this context, only 
enjoyed the freedom to enact their favored tactical recipes, such as quadrillage, so long as they 
did not conflict with civilian policymakers’ vision for how to accomplish France’s objectives. 
 
Fighting and Negotiating 
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Brigadier-General Edouard Cortadellas succeeded Arnaud as France’s military 
commander.  Although Cortadellas was, like Arnaud, a veteran of Indochina and Algeria, the 
conditions of his appointment chastened him to the point that he never challenged his political 
superiors’ authority.  However, Arnaud’s clashes with the MRA and his Chadian counterparts 
had revealed management shortcomings in France’s counterinsurgency.  Wibaux and 
Cortadellas therefore created two institutions to facilitate a comprehensive counterinsurgency 
effort: a Franco-Chadian General Staff to improve inter-military collaboration and a civil-
military general staff to promote cooperation between the DM and MRA.114 
These new institutions promoted more effective cooperation between French civil and 
military actors and between the French and Chadian components of France’s 
counterinsurgency.  Moreover, Wibaux’s incessant requests for more military support drove 
France’s government to send reinforcements, doubling France’s contingent to 2,851 personnel 
with 34 aircraft by late-1969.115  France, meanwhile, also agreed to fund the Chadian army’s 
expansion from 1,900 to 4,300 personnel.116  Wibaux and Cortadellas then replaced Chadian 
field commanders, whom they considered unqualified, with 610 French officers and non-
commissioned officers, sending the Chadians to a two-year officer training program.117  French 
and Chadian forces’ strength and management therefore improved rapidly in early 1970. 
Wibaux continued to dominate French strategy despite the arrival of Cortadellas and 
reinforcements.  Simply put, French forces would clear an area of insurgents, after which 
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regular Chadian forces would deploy and the MRA would establish paramilitary units.  These 
lower-quality forces would then prevent insurgents from returning to the area as the MRA 
reinstalled traditional rulers and reformed local administration.  French authorities hoped to 
pacify Chadian regions one-by-one in this way, starting with economically-productive regions 
near Chad’s capital and then shifting to poorer and more peripheral regions.118 
Franco-Chadian forces consequently launched successive offensives in Guera, Chari 
Baguirmi, Ouaddaï and Salamat provinces between October 1969 and June 1970. 119  The MRA 
established 60 more village militias and reinstalled the Sultans of Ouaddaï and Sila in their 
traditional domains in these offensives’ wake.120  Having distributed 2,410 firearms to 
paramilitaries, more Chadians were now fighting with the French than against them.121  As soon 
as paramilitary forces detected rebel bands, horse-mounted paramilitaries and motorized 
Chadian units converged from multiple directions.  In this manner Franco-Chadian forces 
decimated one rebel band after another, thereby pacifying central Chad by July 1970.122 
Successes in central Chad were, however, offset by developments in northern Chad.  
Gaddafi’s new regime in Libya raised new perils for Tombalbaye.  Gaddafi prioritized ejecting 
Israel from Chad as soon as he came to power in September 1969, but his colleagues in Libya’s 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) opposed overtly intervening.123 Revelations in June 
1970 about Prince Abdallah al-Abid al-Senoussi’s plans to invade Libya with Israeli assistance 
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from Chadian territory, however, then convinced Libyan leaders to support Chad’s 
insurgents.124 
Libya’s government immediately deployed its two most reliable infantry battalions to 
the Chadian frontier to intimidate Chad’s government and then began supplying rebels with 
Second World War vintage armaments.125  More importantly, Gaddafi obliged 600 Tubu 
veterans of Libya’s recently-abolished Royal Guard to join their rebel kinsmen in northern Chad 
and recruited another 150 expatriate Chadians and trained them to fight for FROLINAT.126  
Gaddafi’s infusions of fresh blood and armaments transformed the struggle in northern Chad 
that had been languishing with only 400 rebels.127 
The emboldened Tubus now launched offensives against four objectives: Fada, Zoui, 
Zouar and Bedo.  While the Tubus failed at Zoui and Fada, they won psychologically significant 
victories at Zouar and Bedo.  Rebels defeated a Chadian Army unit near Zouar in June and then 
blockaded Zouar’s garrison in September.128  Slightly thereafter, on 11 October, another Tubu 
band ambushed French paratroops, killing 12 and wounding 15.129  Coming in quick succession, 
these reverses stunned French policymakers.  Cortadellas, indeed, admitted that "The situation 
is entirely new and extremely grave.  I no longer possess either the numeric superiority, 
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firepower advantage or mobility to deal with more than one trouble spot at a time….  I have 
lost the initiative and can only hope to react."130 
Rebels dominated northern Chad even after a hastily assembled relief column broke the 
siege of Zouar in late-October and a heliborne force destroyed a rebel supply base at 
Goubone.131  Cortadellas, therefore, pleaded for reinforcements to mount a decisive 
counteroffensive.132  He envisioned elite forces launching rapid successive anti-guerrilla 
sweeps in France’s Army’s best tradition of action vive.  Cortadellas anticipated that coming to 
grips with elusive Tubu rebels would be difficult, but expected that his heliborne infantry and 
motorized columns could maintain a high-enough operations tempo long enough to erradicate 
them.133  Wibaux and Foccart, however, only aimed to coerce Tubu rebel leaders into 
negotiating a settlement.  They, therefore, approved preparations for an offensive whose 
duration and aims were far more limited than Cortadellas desired.134 
France’s government consequently sent reinforcements and materiel for two months for 
France’s largest offensive, code-named Bison.  Cortadellas attempted to use the 1,250 soldiers 
(900 French and 350 Chadian), 150 vehicles, 18 helicopters, eight attack aircraft and 1,600,000 
liters of stockpiled fuel at his disposal to crush the Tubu rebels beginning on 10 January 1971.135  
Operation Bison’s very size backfired by convincing rebels to hide rather than fight.  During 
the offensive’s first phase (Bison Alpha), the targeted rebel band (150 combatants) escaped 
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detection.  During the next phase (Bison Bravo), French forces located 20 rebels, but suffered 
two dead and five wounded in their haste to engage them.136 
The Tubu‘s traditional leader, the Derdeï, announced at this point his willingness to 
negotiate provided that France agree to a ceasefire.  Cortadellas, for his part, strongly opposed 
a ceasefire, arguing that further operations would defeat the Tubus outright.137  The cabinet, 
however, overruled Cortadellas and imposed a “negotiating pause” on 12 February.  The 
Derdeï, though, duplicitously dragged out negotiations to provide rebels the opportunity to 
either conceal themselves amongst the local population or flee deeper into the mountains.  
French forces consequently failed to locate rebels when they renewed their offensive (Bison 
Charlie) after the Derdeï broke off negotiations.138   
France’s largest offensive in Chad consequently failed after neutralizing only 16 rebels 
out of a thousand active in northern Chad.139  Cortadellas therefore cancelled the planned 
follow-on operation to pacify northern Chad with locally-recruited paramilitary forces before it 
had even begun.  France’s heavy consumption of materiel meanwhile left French forces 
temporarily unable to conduct intensive operations.  The Bison offensive had indeed consumed 
2,400,000 liters of fuel and wore wheeled vehicles down to the point that they were discarded.   
Worse than the offensive’s material results were its psychological ramifications.  French 
elite forces’ failure to defeat Tubu rebels consequently discouraged Chadian officials, who had 
hitherto nourished an exaggerated faith in the efficacy of French arms.140  Cortadellas’ efforts 
                                                          
 136 SHD 11S140 EMA, Opération Bison, 4 February 1971. 
 137 SHD 11S130 Wibaux, Rapport de fin de mission, 31 March 1974. 
 138 IMFT T.1, 329-36. 
139 SHD 11S140 Presentation de l'Opération Bison, 15 June 1971. 
 140 Jackie Neau, L'Intervention de la France dans le conflit tchadien, 1969-1975 
(Paris: Mémoires d'Hommes, 2006), 89-90. 
39 
 
to apply the French counterinsurgency practice of action vive to northern Chad thus foundered 
upon civilian officials’ more limited objectives and their ability to curtail the Army’s offensive.  
The Defense Ministry’s own internal study later reflected on Cortadellas’ reduced authority, 
observing “The commander of the intervention was not… a proconsul in the way commanders 
in Hanoi and Algiers had been….  Although he retained some autonomy… it was nothing 
compared to that enjoyed by his predecessors during past wars.”141 
 
Stabilization and Disengagement 
The upsurge of Tubu attacks in 1970 and Operation Bison’s failure in early 1971 
confronted French policymakers with a new state of affairs.  Rather than confidently 
anticipating the rebellion’s collapse, political leaders now recognized that obtaining decisive 
victories would be prohibitively expensive.  Major figures within France’s government, 
including Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, feared increased casualties and argued for 
withdrawing French forces in July 1971, despite the worsening security situation.142  
Cortadellas and other commanders, however, argued that more offensives would maintain the 
initiative and gradually wear down the guerrillas.  President Pompidou steered a middle course 
between these alternatives of precipitous withdrawal and an open-ended commitment to victory 
by decreeing that he would withdraw from Chad before France’s 1973 legislative campaign.  
Pompidou entrusted Wibaux with laying the groundwork for France to withdraw without 
undermining its broader African alliances. 
Wibaux achieved this by refocusing France’s military and administrative efforts on 
central Chad, and its diplomacy on depriving the rebellion of external support.  Wibaux 
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concluded after months of indecisive operations in Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti that French 
forces could not rapidly vanquish the rebellion in northern Chad.  Tubus were superlative 
guerrillas and their nomadic lifestyle rendered them difficult to control.  The obstacles to 
pacifying northern Chad were, however, exceeded only by the region’s poverty.143 
Wibaux argued that France should abandon all of northern Chad except the urban 
centers of Fada, Largeau, Zouar and Bardaï.  France would use the resources economized in the 
North to consolidate control over Chad’s most productive regions, termed le Tchad utile (useful 
Chad) in the Center.  French diplomacy would, meanwhile, strive to deprive insurgents of 
external sanctuaries.144  Wibaux oversaw the MRA’s and DM’s implementation of this strategy 
and Cortadellas, for his part, redeployed most French military units from northern to central 
Chad after reluctantly abandoning airmobile operations against Tubu guerrillas after a final 
assault in June 1971.145   
The French military’s final act in northern Chad was a massive logistics convoy that 
transported stockpiles of food and equipment large enough to sustain the Chadian Army’s four 
northern bases for six months.  Wibaux prohibited further operations—even potentially 
promising ones—that might escalate hostilities.  France needed its forces in central Chad even 
though the withdrawal from northern Chad emboldened Tubu rebels and discouraged the 
region’s pro-government populations.146 
French intelligence was tracking Libyan efforts to reanimate the rebellion in central 
Chad.  Although France had suppressed the revolution in central Chad by mid-1970, Gaddafi 
helped central Chadian rebels regain the initiative by smuggling arms and material to their 
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camps in Sudan’s Dharfur province.  Gaddafi also permitted FROLINAT to use Radio-Tripoli’s 
powerful transmitters to broadcast propaganda throughout Chad and Sudan.147  Over 1,000 
FROLINAT guerrillas were armed and ready to attack from Sudan by early 1972.  
FROLINAT’s leaders planned to invade central Chad with four large camel caravans that would 
establish liberated areas and recruit new guerrillas.148 
Wibaux, however, was forewarned by French intelligence and preemptively deployed 
the DM’s and MRA’s resources.  The MRA played the preeminent role, expanding its 
paramilitary forces, such that over 100 village militias guarded central Chad by late-1971.149  
To win peasant support, the MRA also drilled 146 village wells and built 21 schools.150  In a 
country as poor as Chad these measures secured the neutrality, if not support, of much of the 
local population.  French administrators used these developments and paramilitary initiatives 
to convince 400 rebels from the Moubi ethnic group to change sides.  France’s entire military 
contingent and Chad’s best units stood poised behind the MRA’s village-level structures ready 
to annihilate any rebel bands detected.  The French, meanwhile, also deployed radio jammers 
to disrupt FROLINAT’s propaganda broadcasts.151 
French precautions had thus transformed central Chad into a well-prepared trap before 
FROLINAT attacked in February 1972.  French and Chadian forces detected all four rebel 
caravans between 18 February and 9 March.  Regular military units pursued, engaged and 
shattered the rebels in each case.152  Once defeated, small rebel groups sought food and refuge 
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in Chadian villages.  Village militias however either slaughtered or drove these survivors into 
the bush.  Ultimately, nearly 60 percent (600 rebels) of FROLINAT’s Sudan-based guerrillas 
perished in this ill-conceived campaign.153 
French policymakers conducted a diplomatic campaign to deprive the rebellion of 
external support in parallel with Wibaux’s efforts in central Chad.  Foccart early on convinced 
the mercurial Central African Republic leader Jean-Bedel Bokassa to extradite FROLINAT 
supporters in January 1970.154  French diplomats then frenetically negotiated with Sudan and 
Libya.  A breakthrough occurred in April 1972, when Sudan’s dictator Jaafar Nimeiri ordered 
his army to massacre 400 Chadian rebels based on his territory.155  Foccart, then, through 
Nigerien President Hamani Diori’s mediation, convinced Gaddafi to cease supporting Chadian 
rebels in exchange for Chad expelling Israeli advisors and ceding de facto control over 
territories on the Chado-Libyan border.156   
France’s cabinet unobtrusively withdrew French forces from Chad in August 1972, well 
before France’s upcoming legislative elections, after establishing Chadian governmental 
control over central Chad and diplomatically isolating FROLINAT.157  The Franco-Chadian 
counterinsurgency campaign had inflicted 5,100 casualties in exchange for 39 French killed 
and 102 wounded, and 629 Chadian military casualties.158  The rebellion consequently 
collapsed in central Chad and was extirpated from its foreign sanctuaries.  France’s government 
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conducted a public relations campaign to convince domestic and international audiences that 
these accomplishments amounted to victory.159   
Field commanders, however, knew that the rebellion’s strength was undiminished in 
northern Chad where Chadian security forces were still unable to operate effectively.160  
Foccart, furthermore, anticipated that Gaddafi would soon renege on his commitments.  While 
France’s intervention saved Tombalbaye’s regime, it stopped short of defeating FROLINAT 
and therefore ensured that Chad’s civil war would continue.  Northern Chad’s Tubu rebels 
capitalized on this situation soon after France’s withdrawal and gradually overwhelmed the 
state’s armed forces, seizing Chad’s capital in 1978, catalyzing events that necessitated further 
French interventions.161  
 
Continuity and Change 
A French motorized column raced across a rugged Sahelian desert to do battle with 
nomadic guerrillas.  The year is 2013 and the country is Mali.  To the untrained eye this scene 
uncannily resembles those that unfolded in Chad four decades previously.  The similarities 
between France’s interventions in this conflict and the preceding one are, moreover, more than 
aesthetic.  France’s political leaders compelled General Bernard Barrera to push forward and 
conclude operations faster than he was comfortable with, just as they had with Cortadellas.  In 
Barrera’s own words, “From the operation’s beginning, the Executive [President] and [Defense] 
Ministry strongly pressured the Armed Forces’ Chief of Staff and his deputy in charge of 
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operations to accelerate, always going further and faster.  This translated into orders to liberate 
Malian cities faster than our logistics allowed us.”162   
Nonetheless, the four intervening decades of technological progress between these 
operations reshaped French practices, even though strong continuities are apparent.  France’s 
armed forces meanwhile recovered the prestige that they had lost in Indochina and Algeria, 
while public confidence in political leaders waned.  This section therefore examines how these 
dynamics impacted French leaders’ management of African interventions.  As will be shown, 
France’s political leaders continue to impose their preference for strategic satisficing, but 
increasingly rely on new communications technologies to supplement proconsular ambassadors 
as their means for imposing that preference.   
Technical means for steering interventions in real time did not yet exist during de 
Gaulle’s era.  It was thus in the Chadian intervention’s immediate aftermath that France began 
building a network of high-powered, high frequency (HF) radio transmitters across Africa.163  
This grid—known as l’Organisation Mondiale Interarmées des Transmissions (OMIT)—
featured both permanent stations and mobile units that could be deployed wherever needed.164  
Even though OMIT did not permit voice communication, it provided political leaders for the 
first time with the ability to control operations from Paris in real time.  The limits of this system, 
which remained incomplete until the late 1970s, prompted France to invest in communications 
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satellites, deploying a network of three Syracuse satellites between 1984 and 1986, which 
provided consistent coverage of Francophone Africa.165   
President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing became the first to use new communications tools 
to direct an intervention, when France intervened to halt Sahrawi nomads, fighting for the 
POLISARIO movement and the Western Sahara’s independence, from raiding Mauritania’s 
iron ore trains in 1977.  Mauritania’s immense size prompted Giscard to rely primarily on air 
power, in the form of fighter-bombers dispatched to Senegal.  In an echo of the Chad 
intervention, Foccart’s successor, René Journiac, dispatched Wibaux to Dakar to oversee the 
operation at a strategic level.  Giscard and his inner circle, however, introduced an additional 
level of political-military complexity because they combined their tactic of airstrikes in 
Mauritania with negotiations with POLISARIO in Algeria.166  To best coordinate these far-
flung air strikes and negotiations, Giscard insisted on approving each attack from Paris via a 
combination of OMIT transmitted HF messages and telephone communications.167 
Despite technical glitches, Giscard’s direction of Mauritanian air strikes yielded swift 
results, deterring further POLISARIO raids after three precise strikes.  This successful 
experience of micromanaging operations from Paris encouraged Giscard to apply the same 
techniques when France re-intervened in Chad the following year.  This time in Operation 
Tacaud, the French government combined the appointment of a civilian proconsul, Ambassador 
Louis Dallier, with the President’s direction of operations from Paris.  In principle, the HF 
liaison linking the Defence Ministry’s Operations’ Centre to the military headquarters in Chad 
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offered faster communications with Paris than the Embassy, where the ambassador received 
general instructions from Journiac.  Leaders in Paris used these two systems to fashion France’s 
use of force.    
The coexistence of two channels of command, however, proved deeply problematic 
when two Chadian factions turned upon one another in early 1980.168  As the crisis unravelled, 
Journiac instructed Ambassador Dallier that French forces should adopt a neutral posture.  
Giscard, however, opined to the French military’s chief of staff, General Guy Méry, that France 
should align itself with Hissène Habré’s faction, which appeared more powerful.  Méry 
therefore used HF communications to order France’s field commander, General Louis Forest, 
to facilitate Habré’s victory by allowing his forces to pass through French roadblocks.169  
Dallier’s and Forest’s contradictory orders confused lower-level commanders and French 
forces’ inconsistent behaviour convinced all Chadian factions of their duplicity.170  
French leaders’ use of nearly instant communications grew during France’s next African 
intervention.  During Operation Manta—France’s 1983-84 intervention in Chad—political 
leaders insisted on steering even minor military actions from Paris.  One French colonel 
observed, “By expressing their exaggerated belief in ‘sophisticated’ communications, 
[political] authorities clearly indicated their desire to ‘pilot the crisis’.  No latitude is left to 
Manta’s commander.  He is not a general entrusted with a command, but instead an orderly tied 
to a telegraph.”171   
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The OMIT network that French leaders relied on at this stage was, moreover, woefully 
inadequate for how they used it.  OMIT messages generally took 10 minutes to cypher and 
transmit, and a response could, at best, be expected 30 minutes later.172  Delays such as these 
proved catastrophic during fast-moving crises, such as occurred when Libyan-backed forces 
attacked the Chadian Army at Oum-Chalouba in September 1983.  France’s field commander, 
General Guichard, rapidly concluded that only air strikes could salvage the situation.  He 
needed, however, political leaders’ assent for such strikes.  Between transmission delays and 
the time needed for the message to reach the President or Defence Minister, it took 65 minutes 
for Guichard to receive permission to launch air strikes.  By this point, however, the battle of 
Oum-Chalouba was already over, won in extremis by France’s allies.173    
Even when commanders like Guichard received orders in a timely manner, those orders 
were crafted by a process that privileged political and diplomatic considerations over military 
ones.  Admiral Jacques Lanxade, who led France’s armed forces late in the Mitterrand 
administration, lamented this mode of crisis management.  According to Lanxade, civilians 
decided matters of crucial importance in so-called “crisis cells” organized at France’s Foreign 
Ministry.174  Within these cells, “Discussions are dominated by civilian staff members from the 
Foreign and Defence Ministries, and the Prime Minister’s Office….  When military officers are 
invited, they are generally of a rank too low to influence decisions.”175   
Politicians’ use of new communications technologies to steer interventions from Paris 
was not however a consistent or unidirectional process.  Politicians can and did privilege 
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civilian proconsuls over long-distance micromanagement on occasion.  President Jacques 
Chirac, for example, empowered a special ambassador when French forces intervened amidst 
army mutinies and attempted coups in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 1996-97.  In his 
personal instructions to Jean-Marc Simon, a diplomat with considerable conflict experience, 
Chirac told Simon, “You could demand a more prestigious post, but we need you there [in the 
CAR].  You will be, all at once, our governor, our general, our diplomat, and above all my 
friend.”176  Once in Bangui, Simon comported himself as Chirac directed, shaping military 
operations and brokering agreements between warring factions. 
Even as French leaders juggled the opportunities provided by new communications 
technologies with the institutional tools de Gaulle developed for managing interventions, 
France also experienced a prolonged upsurge in the armed forces’ popularity.  Public approval 
for France’s military arguably reached its nadir in the early Fifth Republic, following the 
military’s repeated interventions in politics and “lost” wars.  Public approval for the military, 
however, soared since the 1990s.  Opinion polls, consequently, reveal that public confidence in 
France’s armed forces climbed 20 points in two decades.177  Today, the armed forces enjoy an 
82 percent approval rating and are therefore France’s second most popular institution, lagging 
one point behind hospitals, but significantly outperforming the media or politicians.178          
A range of factors are driving this growth in the armed forces’ popularity.  Receding 
memories of the Algerian War and the militaries’ professionalization in the mid-1990s have 
distanced French citizens from their negative associations with the armed forces.  A succession 
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of “popular” interventions—beginning with the 1991 Gulf War and proceeding through peace-
making in the Balkans, to conclude with France’s intervention in Mali—have all reinforced the 
military’s perceived legitimacy as an expert body striving for the public good in a manner that 
prior French African interventions had not.179  Coming on top of these developments, the 
military’s domestic counter-terrorism deployment, Operational Sentinelle, following the 2015 
Paris terrorist attacks drove the military’s popularity to its current stratospheric levels.180 
The armed forces’ increasing popularity and high operational tempo have empowered 
military officers to increasingly express their discontent with national defence policy.181  Armed 
forces chief of staff, General Pierre de Villiers, did this most publicly with his critiques of the 
government’s low level of defence spending.182  As Grégory Daho demonstrates, the 
combination of public esteem and operational experience is also eroding the pre-existing 
“taboo” of military officers positively evoking French doctrine and accomplishments during 
the Algerian War.183  Despite French commanders’ increasing willingness to publicly express 
themselves, their activism has not as yet altered how France intervenes in Africa. 
A key reason for this that de Gaulle’s formula for managing foreign interventions 
depends on institutions that circumscribe the military’s domain of competence and pit military 
commanders against one another in parallel chains of command, rather than an assumption that 
individual commanders behave meekly.  Moreover, French military leaders have accustomed 
                                                          
179 Grégory Daho, La transformation des armées: Enquête sur les relations civilo-
militaires en France (Paris: Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2016), 95-109.   
180 Chéron, 108-16. 
181 Ibid, 48-54. 
182 Pierre de Villiers, Servir (Paris: Fayard, 2017), 125-62. 
183 Grégory Daho, “The erosion of the Algerian taboo: An alternative explanation for 
the transformation of military organisations in France,“ Revue Française de Science Politique 
64/1 (2014), 57-78. 
50 
 
themselves to working through these institutions and are justifiably satisfied with the level of 
activism that they permit.  Strategic satisficing, in other words, permits France to intervene 
more frequently than other states of a similar size and French officers are proud of that.  General 
Benoît Pugo, who served as President François Holland’s personal chief of staff, lauded this 
system in the following terms, “The decision-making process permits the president to rapidly 
bring together all essential actors and then give orders directly to military commanders.  It’s the 
best [process] in the world.”184  France’s most recent major African intervention, Operation 
Serval in Mali, therefore demonstrates strong continuities with prior African interventions in 
its management.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Political leaders, within this context, implemented a combination of new technology-
based and older personnel-based techniques for shaping operations.  President Holland sacked 
the career diplomat representing France and replaced him with a specialist “crisis manager” in 
an echo of de Gaulle’s dispatch of Wibaux to Chad.  France’s new ambassador in Bamako, 
Gilles Huberson, possessed formidable credentials for overseeing an intervention having served 
as a military officer before embarking on a diplomatic career and having managed the Foreign 
Ministry’s Mali-Sahel counter-terrorism assistance program immediately prior to this 
appointment.185 
Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian soon however disabused colleagues of the notion 
that either Huberson or France’s field commander, General Barrera, would play the primary 
role in shaping France’s intervention.  Le Drian, indeed, organized a so-called “war room” 
around his personal cabinet that decided most important matters at meetings organized up to 
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three times a day.  Civilians dominated these meetings and most of the invited military officers 
represented intelligence agencies.186  President Holland, meanwhile, relied on his private 
military staff to monitor operations and issued orders directly to field commanders via his 
personal chief of staff, General Pugo.187  The armed forces’ headquarters and professional 
military planners, meanwhile, felt marginalized.  One general confided to journalists that the 
military’s leadership felt relegated to a “second class” position.188 
The upshot of this civilian-dominated process was a plan with all of strategic 
satisficing’s hallmarks.  France would quickly smash al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s 
(AQIM) larger units, convincing African allies of France’s continued great power status, and 
then expeditiously hand over responsibility for reconquered territories to an African 
peacemaking force.  Central to this plan were the twin notions that French forces could rapidly 
“break” AQIM and that African troops would suffice, with minimal support, for subsequent 
pacification duties.  Military commanders, however, harbored reservations about both 
assumptions.  General Barrera, for example, felt pressured to maintain an excessive operational 
tempo.189  Many military officers, meanwhile, doubted whether African states would provide 
either the quantity or quality of troops needed.190   
In practice, France’s intervention in Mali evinced strategic satisficing’s strengths and 
weaknesses.  France retook the cities that AQIM had seized and then assaulted the jihadists’ 
bastions in northeastern Mali in a 100 day campaign.  Combined arms battles inflicted hundreds 
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of casualties and French forces captured over 200 tons of arms and munitions, losing only six 
French soldiers in the process.191  Better still, the French organized democratic elections in 
August 2013, while insurgents were still reeling from these blows.  The speed and seeming 
completeness of France’s triumph convinced many abroad that France possessed some form of 
sublime savoir faire when it came to African interventions and led institutions, such as 
America’s RAND Corporation, to examine France’s experience for transferrable lessons.192  
The enemy, however, often evaded encirclements and lived to fight another day. 
These fighters soon reemerged to harry Malian and African forces once French combat 
troops withdrew.  Morale plummeted amongst the Malian soldiers, leading observers to 
conclude that France was failing to reconstitute Mali’s armed forces.  Jihadist attacks on African 
peacekeepers, meanwhile, exacted a heavy toll, killing over 150 soldiers by early 2018.193  
Mali’s deteriorating security situation since Operation Serval has gotten so bad that writers in 
the Defense Ministry’s journal Défense Nationale now opine that “If we continue in a spirit of 
‘business as usual’ the future will be dark for Mali and the broader region as well.”194 
These later operations demonstrate the robustness of de Gaulle’s reforms, which put 
political leaders into the proverbial driver’s seat when it came to employing force.  Improved 
communications consequently only reinforced politicians’ ability to steer operations.  Military 
commanders‘ increasing willingness to publicly express themselves, meanwhile, has yet to 
change this state of affairs.  Continuity in whose preferences led, in turn, to further strategic 
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satisficing, with forces of similar size intervening to achieve minimal objectives and thereby 
setting the stage for France to swiftly hand over responsibility to African forces. 
 
Conclusion 
France’s interventions in Africa represent a clear case of policymaking institutions’ 
triumph over the military’s deeply held beliefs.  At the strategic and operational levels, political 
and military leaders held diametrically opposed preferences, with the military privileging 
comprehensive victories through lengthy campaigns, while politicians sought satisfactory 
political outcomes through the punctual application of minimal force.  The Fifth Republic’s 
new institutions, in effect, empower politicians to impose their preferences on the military.  The 
upshot is strategic satisficing and the close coordination of diplomatic and military initiatives, 
rather than the preceding era’s military-dominated efforts to achieve total victory.   
These findings, in turn, have powerful implications for our understanding of: 1) military 
cultures’ impact on how states wage war; 2) how military power translates into foreign policy 
influence; and 3) France’s impact on Africa. 
A considerable literature has developed about different armed forces’ distinctive 
organizational cultures.  My examination demonstrates both the value and limits of such 
approaches.  French officers, indeed, possessed strong beliefs about how counterinsurgencies 
should be conducted.  They therefore sought to apply their pre-existing counterinsurgency 
templates, such as the classic dichotomy of action lente and action vive, and tactics such as 
quadrillage, to new situations.  Commanders’ pursuit of these preferences was, however, 
strictly circumscribed by new institutions that empowered civilian policymakers to limit 
military activities whenever they thought doing so would achieve their ends more expeditiously.  
To the extent that this strict subordination of military desiderata to political control enhances 
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French power, this study supports Douglas Porch’s argument that population-centric 
counterinsurgency’s tactical recipes should not be allowed to dictate strategy.195   
At the same time as constraining commanders, French institutions enable political 
leaders to impose their preferences.  Strategic satisficing—meaning the use of minimal force 
for short durations to produce satisfactory political outcomes—thus became the new leitmotif 
of French operations.  From a politician’s perspective, operating in this manner enabled France 
to sustain its African sphere of influence without over-committing itself to such a degree as to 
catalyse a domestic backlash.  They therefore exploited the institutional tools at their disposal 
to relentlessly push the military to conclude operations as soon as possible and limit France’s 
commitment to the lowest possible level.  The lower domestic political costs that leaders pay to 
intervene abroad arguably renders France’ military power more fungible—meaning that it 
provides more international influence—that that of other states with similar material resources.   
France’s demonstrated willingness to intervene in Chad, indeed, enticed Belgium’s ex-
colonies to seek military accords with France, including Burundi (1969), Congo-Zaire (1974) 
and Rwanda (1975).196  Later French interventions prompted certain ex-British colonies to 
follow suit, including the Seychelles (1979), Malawi (1980) and Zimbabwe (1997).197  French 
policymakers and scholars have taken to framing this facility for rapid intervention as a national 
exception.  As already mentioned, General Puga characterizes this system as “the best in the 
world.”198  An academic study, for example, recently concluded that “despite its apparent 
complexity, it [France’s decision-making process] permits a rapid and tailored decision…. this 
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system, as unique as it is, inspires admiration and jealousy amongst our European 
counterparts.”199    
While France’s ability to intervene at minimal cost and risk to itself bolsters its stature, 
its interventionism often proves less salutary for African partners.  France’s propensity to 
deploy only enough force to achieve minimal political objectives rarely ends conflicts.  Such 
was the case in 1969-72.  FROLINAT would have won had France not intervened and France’s 
intervention degraded, but did not destroy Chad’s rebellion, prolonging that war until 1979.  
France’s parsimonious use of force thus established conditions that necessitated three further 
interventions, Operations Tacaud (1978-82), Manta (1983-84) and Epervier (1986-2014).  
Interventions followed similar patterns elsewhere and events obliged France to re-intervene, 
within five years, after 58 percent of France’s African interventions.200     
In short, strategic satisficing—an approach far different from traditional French 
counterinsurgency practices—facilitates the Fifth Republic’s military interventionism.  The 
tightly coupled application of military force and diplomacy in pursuit of limited objectives 
enables an otherwise medium-sized state, France, to serve as Africa’s gendarme, intervening in 
intra-state conflicts and maintaining a network of security agreements with African states.  It is 
questionable, however, whether France’s particular style of intervention serves African 
interests as well as French ones, since France’s limited interventions rarely end conflicts. 
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